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Intentional Killing Without Intending to Kill: Knobe’s
Theory as a Rational Limit on Felony Murder
Joseph C. Mauro*
ABSTRACT
Felony murder authorizes maximum criminal punishment, the
kind typically reserved for the most ruthless and calculating killers,
for defendants who did not even intend to kill. Many retributivist
scholars therefore criticize felony murder for abandoning the
traditional notion that intent determines culpability and the
appropriate degree of punishment. Despite widespread agreement
with this criticism, however, felony murder persists in most
jurisdictions.
Joshua Knobe’s empirical research turns this problem on its
head by suggesting that intent is not just a mental state. Numerous
experiments have shown, in fact, that people are more likely to call
an action intentional, regardless of what the actor is thinking, when
it involves morally bad conduct and outcomes. Knobe thus argues
that intent refers not only to a mental state but also to the morality
(good or bad) of conduct and the outcomes it causes.
Under Knobe’s theory, some instances of felony murder are
actually intentional, even if the defendant did not subjectively intend
to kill or recklessly endanger. That is, when the defendant’s conduct
(a dangerous felony), mental state (willingness to risk death) and the
outcome (death) are sufficiently bad, the action, as a whole, is
intentional. Restricting felony murder to such “intentional” killings,
I propose, would not only re-couple punishment to intent, satisfying
retributive theory, but also eliminate the most troublesome
applications of the rule.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider this scenario. The CEO of a major corporation has
developed a new business plan. Her only goal is to make money,
and the plan is going to make lots of it. Before the plan is
implemented, one of her advisors comes to her looking distressed.
“Your plan is going to destroy 200,000 acres of rainforest,” says the
advisor.
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“I’ve never cared about the environment,” says the CEO. “I only
care about money. Now go ahead with the plan.”
The CEO of a second corporation has developed a new plan as
well. Like the first CEO, her only goal is to make money, and her
plan is going to make lots of it. Before the plan is implemented, one
of her advisors comes to her looking excited. “Not only is your plan
going to make lots of money,” he says, “it’s also going to save
200,000 acres of rainforest that otherwise would have been
destroyed.”
“I’ve never cared about the environment,” says the CEO. “I only
care about money. Now go ahead with the plan.”
Did the CEOs intentionally affect the environment? In a sense,
neither of them did. They only cared about money and had no
feelings about the environment. On the other hand, both CEOs
intentionally affected the environment. They knew that their actions
would affect the environment and decided to act. Yet whether they
intentionally affected the environment or not, the answer must be the
same for each CEO, right?
Surprisingly, most people give a different answer for each CEO.
When asked about these scenarios, 87% of people said the first CEO
intentionally harmed the environment, while only 20% said the
second CEO intentionally helped the environment.1 Numerous
studies have obtained similar results, and one trend among the
studies is that when people perceive an action to be morally bad,
they are more likely to call it intentional. This phenomenon, broadly
speaking, is called the Knobe Effect.2
According to some experts, this research suggests that intent
refers not only to a person’s mental state but also to the morality of
her conduct and the outcomes it causes.3 Under this theory, when
conduct, outcomes, and the person’s mental state are sufficiently
bad, the action is intentional.4 Some experts disagree, maintaining
1. Joshua Knobe & Arudra Burra, The Folk Concepts of Intention and
Intentional Action: A Cross-Cultural Study, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 113, 117–
18 (2006).
2. Some researchers define the Knobe Effect more narrowly, applying it
only to Joshua Knobe’s 2003 study. Research involving the phenomenon has
expanded since 2003, however, and this Article uses the term Knobe Effect to refer
to the broader phenomenon that the morality of an action affects people’s
perceptions of whether it was intentional. See infra Part II.A.
3. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 123–25. The same is true of words such
as intention, intentionally, and intend.
4. Id. See also Thomas Nadelhoffer, Skill, Luck, Control, and Intentional
Action, 18 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 341, 351 (2005) (“[B]y surveying the folk, I hoped to
find out which conceptual analyses of intentional action actually settle with their
intuitions, so that philosophers will no longer be able to align their analyses with
common sense unless their views empirically merit such support. Of course, that
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that intent is nothing but a mental state and that the Knobe Effect
simply represents a mistaken perception of mental states.5
Nevertheless, Joshua Knobe, the author of the study involving the
CEOs, argues that the Knobe Effect is relevant to the meaning of
intent.6 An action can be intentional, he says, by virtue of morally
bad conduct and outcomes, even if the person did not subjectively
want the outcomes to occur. Knobe’s is a more objectively
observable conception of intent.7
Knobe’s theory casts new light on the most common retributivist
criticism of felony murder. Felony murder authorizes murder-level
punishment when the defendant killed in the course of committing a
dangerous felony, even if the defendant did not have the mental state
traditionally required for murder.8 Whereas murder typically requires
proof of a certain mental state—for example, “premeditation and
deliberation,” “intent to kill,” or “recklessness”9—felony murder
requires none of these things. In cases of felony murder, most
jurisdictions simply presume that the defendant had the mental state
required for murder because a dangerous felony caused a person to
die.10
Retributivist critics therefore complain that felony murder does
not tailor punishment to the defendant’s culpability.11 Intent
determines culpability, they say, and felony murder is thus

would not mean that analyses privileged by the endorsement of the folk are true,
only that the burden of proof would be placed squarely on the shoulders” of the
opponents of such analyses.).
5. Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 341, 344. See also Joshua Knobe, Person as
Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 315 (2010).
6. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 123–25.
7. Knobe’s theory of intentional action still requires the person to have a
morally bad mental state regarding the outcome but does not require the person to
subjectively intend to bring it about or even risk it.
8. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 51 (2006).
9. Id. §§ 40, 42.
10. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 449, 455–58
(1985). The felony’s dangerousness is important because most states restrict
felony murder to underlying felonies that are clearly or inherently dangerous, with
the idea that, in such cases, the death was foreseeable. See Leonard Birdsong,
Felony Murder: A Historical Perspective by Which to Understand Today’s
Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV 1, 21 & n.140
(2006). This limitation is important for Knobe as well because if a killing is purely
accidental, people will not make the moral judgment that causes them to label it
intentional. See infra Parts II.C, III.A.
11. Felony murder is attacked under other theories of punishment as well, but
those arguments are beyond the scope of this Article, which is confined to the
retributivist framework.
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illegitimate because it does not require proof of intent.12 Without
proof of intent, the state cannot judge whether the defendant is
culpable enough for murder-level punishment.13
Knobe’s theory addresses this problem by suggesting that
lawmakers can actually amend the felony murder rule to require proof
of intent.14 Even if the defendant did not mean to kill, the killing was
intentional under Knobe’s theory if the defendant’s mental state and
conduct were sufficiently immoral, taking for granted that the
outcome of death is maximally immoral.15 Moreover, if felony
murder were restricted to such cases, then it would be better tailored
to the most culpable defendants and would no longer fall subject to
the retributivist charge that it ignores intent. Part I articulates this
retributivist criticism, Part II describes how Knobe’s theory addresses
it, and Part III deals with three counterarguments.
II. THE RETRIBUTIVIST CRITICISM: FELONY MURDER IGNORES
GRADATIONS OF CULPABILITY
Retributivist scholars criticize felony murder for departing from
the traditional framework in which intent determines culpability and
culpability determines punishment.16 Felony murder, they say,
12. David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of Modern
Criticisms: Doesn’t the Conclusion Depend upon the Particular Rule at Issue?, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1155, 1159–60 (2009); James J. Tomkovicz, The
Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That Shape Our
Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1441 (1994). Although states use
various sentencing schemes to determine which punishments are appropriate, a
murder conviction almost always authorizes greater punishment than a conviction
for negligent homicide and often authorizes the most severe punishment in the
jurisdiction. See 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 73, 75.
13. Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60. But see infra Part II.B (discussing
whether subjective intent is the only component of culpability).
14. I do not mean to suggest that the concept of legal intent is uniform. To the
contrary, legal doctrines vary with respect to how they define and use the concept of
intent. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–95 & n.12 (1987)
(distinguishing the intent elements of Title VII cases, capital cases, and voting rights
cases). My argument simply focuses on the linguistic meaning of intent, i.e., what
people actually mean when they talk about it. I argue that in the homicide context,
the linguistic meaning of intent is crucial because a murder conviction is not justified
(under the retributivist theory) unless the killing was truly intentional, not just legally
“intentional.”
15. See infra Part II.C for a discussion of which types of conduct and mental
states can make an undesired killing intentional.
16. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY &
BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 170–71 (1995). See also
generally Norman J. Finkel & Stefanie F. Smith, Principals and Accessories in
Capital Felony-Murder: The Proportionality Principle Reigns Supreme, 27 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 129 (1993).
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ignores gradations of culpability by not requiring proof of intent.17
In other words, murder convictions should require proof that the
defendant had a highly culpable intent regarding the death—that she
intended it or exhibited a depraved recklessness toward it18—and
felony murder ignores this requirement. Many retributivist scholars
therefore consider the rule unjustified.19
Indeed, felony murder is the only murder rule that does not
require proof of any particular mental state.20 Traditionally, a
homicide is not murder unless the state proves that it was done with
“premeditation and deliberation,” “recklessness,” “malice
aforethought,” “indifference to human life,” or any number of other
highly culpable mental states.21 In cases of felony murder, on the
other hand,
the only intent required for a killer to be convicted . . . is
generally the intent to commit or to participate in the
underlying felony, and felony murder generally does not
require as elements intent to kill, malice, premeditation or
deliberation, willfulness, or even that [the] defendant [knew]
17. Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60; Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1441.
18. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1439–40.
19. That is, unless one accepts the “constructive malice theory” or the “evil
mind theory.” See Roth & Sundby, supra note 10, at 455–58. The “evil mind”
theory presumes that felony murder defendants satisfy the intent element of
murder, whatever it may be in the jurisdiction, because the felonious action that
caused the death proves that the defendant had an “evil mind,” which is sufficient
evidence of culpable intent. Id. The “constructive malice” theory, on the other
hand, does not presume that the defendant had a culpable intent but holds instead
that the underlying felony, regardless of what was going on in the defendant’s
mind, makes her so culpable that the state is justified in imputing the mens rea for
murder to her. The “constructive malice” rationale is thus intellectually honest
about the fact that the defendant may not have had a subjective intent to kill or
recklessly endanger and therefore employs “a ‘mens rea-imposing mechanism’”
that treats the defendant as though she had the subjective intent traditionally
required for murder. Id. at 455–56 (citation omitted).
20. Compare 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 51 (2006), with 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 34,
36, 38, 39. Even so, 35 states restrict felony murder to “inherently” dangerous
felonies that show that the defendant at least acted with some amount of
carelessness or disdain for human life. See Birdsong, supra note 10, at 21 & n.140;
Crump, supra note 12, at 1181 (explaining that the “primitive form of felony
murder [under which, for example, a pickpocket can be convicted of murder when
his mark dies in a freak accident] is a caricature, inasmuch as modern jurisdictions
confine the felony murder rule [to inherently dangerous felonies or conduct]”
(citation omitted)). See also Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony
Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 202 (2004) (observing that American felony
murder laws, from their inception, have been confined to felonies involving “the
deliberate infliction of violence”).
21. 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 40, 42.
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that his or her acts [would] cause death or great bodily harm
to the victim.22
Additionally, the state does not need to prove the underlying
felony. The underlying felony is simply a factual element of the
crime: “[A] felony-murder conviction may stand even if the
underlying felony which serves as its predicate is not submitted to
the jury, or is dismissed, or there is an acquittal of the underlying
felony, or where a conviction on the underlying felony is vacated.”23
A number of courts and scholars have articulated the above
criticism of felony murder.24 The Model Penal Code, for example,
appears to have abolished felony murder because it lacks an intent
element.25 James Tomkovicz similarly argues that felony murder is
22. Id. § 51.
23. 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 51. A few states, however, do not allow convictions
of first-degree felony murder without proof of malice or premeditation and
deliberation. Id. n.29–32.
24. See Crump, supra note 12, at 1158 n.10 (listing several articles advancing
this criticism, including Robert M. Elliot, The Merger Doctrine as a Limitation on
the Felony-Murder Rule: A Balance of Criminal Law Principles, 13 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 369, 371 (1977) (“[T]he rule does violence to the philosophy
which dictates that criminal liability should be commensurate with moral
culpability.”); George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 SW. U. L.
REV. 413, 428 (1981) (“When the felony-murder rule converts an accidental death
into first-degree murder, then punishment is rendered disproportionate to the
wrong for which the offender is personally responsible.”); Jeanne H. Seibold, The
Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133, 160
(1978) (“The concept of basing the degree of punishment on the seriousness of the
result of the criminal act seems grossly misplaced in a legal system which
recognizes the degree of mental culpability as the appropriate standard for fixing
criminal liability.”)).
25. Id. at 1159–60, 1164 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. (1982)).
On the other hand, the Model Penal Code (MPC) appears to have crafted its
definition of homicide to make room for felony murder by allowing murder
convictions when the defendant exhibited “extreme indifference” to human life.
Id. at 1164 (“[T]he MPC attempts to cover the felony murder situation by an odd
combination: a confusing concept of recklessness coupled with a presumption.
First, the MPC defines murder to include homicides committed ‘recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.’ This
sentence contains several vague concepts that are likely to produce inconsistency
and arbitrariness in verdicts. For example, two juries can differ significantly
enough over the kinds of indifference that are ‘extreme’ that they produce
seriously inconsistent verdicts. Furthermore, some jurors may be motivated to find
‘extreme’ indifference because of improper factors such as the defendant's
lifestyle, personality, or ethnicity. Next, the MPC provides that the requisite
recklessness and indifference are ‘presumed’ if the actor was engaged in any of
several named felonies. A criminal presumption, of course, requires the judge to
tell the jury that it can follow or disregard the presumption as it chooses. A wellcrafted felony murder law would provide greater clarity and thus confine
discretion better than the MPC’s backdoor method of ostensibly ‘abolishing’ the
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unjustified because it does not require proof of the defendant’s
mental state.26 Retributive criminal theory, he says, depends upon
“the idea that punishment should be commensurate with mental
fault.”27 The Michigan Supreme Court articulated the same criticism
in abolishing felony murder in that state:
It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent,
or reckless homicide into a murder simply because, without
more, the killing was in furtherance of a criminal objective
of some defined class. [Instead, murder requires a showing
of] recklessness . . . or a practical certainty or intent, with
respect to causing death, [which is] an independent
determination . . . on the facts of each case.28
The court is likely correct that, “without more,” a killing during
the commission of a felony is insufficient to prove murder-level
culpability. Traditional retributive theory requires, at a minimum,
some proof of intent. Accordingly, to bring felony murder in line
with retributive theory, it would need to be limited to cases in which
the killing was actually intentional.
III. ARGUMENT: FELONY MURDER CAN BE LIMITED TO INTENTIONAL
KILLINGS AND THUS JUSTIFIED UNDER RETRIBUTIVE THEORY
According to Knobe, the Knobe Effect shows that intent refers
not only to a mental state but also to the morality of conduct and
outcomes.29 If this is true, then some cases of felony murder involve
intentional killings because the immoral conduct (a dangerous
felony), immoral outcome (a death), and a sufficiently immoral
mental state regarding the death (a willingness to risk it), combine to
make the action, as a whole, intentional.30 In fact, the indicators of
intent under Knobe’s theory (conduct, outcomes, and mental state)
are the same factors that some retributivist scholars would use to
tailor felony murder to the most culpable defendants.31 A properly

rule while actually preserving it in an altered form.” (citations omitted)). See also
infra Part III.A (discussing the similarity between the Michigan Supreme Court’s
“abrogation” of felony murder in People v. Aaron and a restriction to killings that
are intentional under Knobe’s theory).
26. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1441.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Mich. 1980) (citation omitted).
29. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 123–25.
30. See infra Part III.C (discussing which mental states are required to call a
killing intentional under Knobe’s theory).
31. See infra Part II.B.
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limited version of felony murder, therefore, far from undermining
intent-based culpability, would actually support it.
A. Knobe’s Theory: Intent Describes Morality
Following Knobe’s groundbreaking study, subsequent research
confirmed and expanded his findings.32 For example, studies found
that the Knobe Effect occurs when intent is described in terms such as
intention, deciding, desire, in favor of, in order to, and advocating.33
It also occurs at what might be called the edges of linguistic intent: In
the scenario involving the CEOs, for instance, people are willing to
say that the first CEO “increased profits by harming the environment”
but not that the second CEO “increased profits by helping the
environment.”34 Another study showed that the Knobe Effect occurs
even when the actor did not know that the bad outcome would result
but nonetheless wanted it to happen.35 Thus, for the purposes of this
Article, the Knobe Effect refers to the entire body of research showing
that the morality of an action affects the extent to which it is, or is
perceived to be, intentional.
According to Knobe, this research shows that intent is more than
a mental state. He argues that subjectively intending something is
distinct from the broader concept of acting intentionally,36 which
describes the morality of conduct and outcomes in addition to
mental states.37 In other words, immoral conduct that causes a bad
outcome can make an action intentional even in the absence of

32. Recall that Knobe’s study about the CEOs revealed that people are more
likely to call morally bad actions intentional. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at
118–19. When the CEO harmed the environment, 87% of people said she did so
intentionally, but when the CEO helped the environment, only 20% of people said
she did so intentionally. Id.
33. Knobe, supra note 5, at 318; JOSHUA KNOBE & SHAUN NICHOLS,
EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 137 (2008). Additionally, one study showed that
“people are willing to say: ‘The chairman harmed the environment in order to
increase profits. But not: the chairman helped the environment in order to increase
profits.’” Knobe, supra note 5, at 319.
34. Id.
35. Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 345–46. See also infra Part III.B (discussing
the possibility that the Knobe Effect does not occur unless the person knew her
actions would cause the relevant outcome).
36. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 124.
37. But see Knobe, supra note 5, at 349 (referencing Thomas Scanlon’s
argument that the Knobe Effect actually depends on people’s perceptions of
mental states). See also infra Part III.C (discussing whether the Knobe Effect
alters the meaning of intent (Knobe’s theory) or simply represents a mistaken
perception of mental states).
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subjective intent.38 If Knobe is correct, then felony murders are
often intentional because, when a dangerous felony causes a death,
the moral badness of the conduct and outcome make the entire
action intentional even if the person did not subjectively intend to
kill.39
Lawrence Solan describes the Knobe Effect’s mechanism,
illuminating the connection between Knobe’s theory and felony
murder. He hypothesizes a baseline of subjective intentions that
people expect of one another.40 In general, people assume that
everyone intends good outcomes.41 If a person fails to intend good
outcomes—for example, when the CEO does not care about
affecting the environment—then that person falls below the baseline
of expected intentions.
Solan thus argues that only morally bad actions need to be
described as intentional because people assume, based on the
baseline, that good actions were subjectively intended.42 He refers to
Paul Grice’s “Maxim of Quantity,” which holds that dialogue should
only include relevant statements, and concludes that people need not
mention the intent behind an action unless it contradicts the general
presumption that everyone intends good outcomes.43 For purposes
of this article, Solan’s theory of the Knobe Effect’s mechanics will
be called the baseline theory.44
38. According to Knobe, there is no reason to assume that “a theory of
intentional action needs to be related to a conception of future intention.” Knobe,
supra note 1, at 115.
39. Id. Again, this assumes that the defendant had some culpable mental state,
short of intent to kill or recklessly endanger, regarding the death. See infra Part
II.C. But see Lawrence M. Solan, Blame, Praise, and the Structure of Legal Rules,
75 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 526–27, 529 (2009) (discussing Steve Guglielmo and
Bertram Malle’s explanation of the Knobe Effect and referring to a study by
Steven Sverdlik that found that “when given the opportunity, people are perfectly
willing to find conduct both blameworthy and unintentional at the same time”
(citation omitted)); Knobe, supra note 5, at 339 (referencing Frank Hindriks’s
theory that what motivates the Knobe Effect is the actor’s failure to take adequate
precautions to avoid a foreseen bad outcome: “In criminal law, foresight betrays a
guilty mind as much as intent does: both reveal that the agent is not properly
motivated to avoid an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our
judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even when unintended. In
contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea that acting intentionally is acting with a
certain frame of mind.”).
40. There may be a normative element to these expectations, but as described
in Solan’s piece, they are primarily predictive. See Solan, supra note 39, at 522–
28.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 522.
43. Id.
44. Joseph Ulatowski and Justus Johnson contend that while it might make
sense to talk about a baseline of expected intentions, the theory is not valid unless
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Solan proves his baseline theory with a thought experiment
involving Mario and a printer.45 When someone says, “Mario fixed
the printer,” there is no need to say he did so intentionally because
people presume that he intended to cause the good outcome. In
contrast, when someone says, “Mario broke the printer,” people
assume that he did not intend to do so because the outcome was bad.
Thus, neither of these scenarios gives people a reason to call Mario’s
actions intentional because there is no reason to think that he fell
below the baseline of expected intentions.
People abandon their expectations, however, when they learn that
sub-baseline intentions caused morally bad outcomes—for example,
when the CEO did not care about the environment and then harmed it.
Unlike Mario, the CEO fell below the perceived baseline of expected
intentions because she did not care about harming the environment.
When the environment was harmed, people therefore had a reason to
say something about her intent. People noted her sub-baseline
intentions, and expressed disapproval of them,46 by saying that she
caused the harm intentionally.47 Yet, importantly, sub-baseline

the baseline is more clearly defined. Knobe, supra note 5, at 352–53 (“[W]e find it
hard to ascribe a coherent view to some experimental subjects if the default
position is not clearly defined.”). Additionally, some research suggests that
morality and culpability are unrelated to the perception of intent. See, e.g., Knobe,
supra note 5, at 349 (wherein Thomas M. Scanlon argues that Knobe’s description
of the Knobe Effect equivocates between being “belief-intentional” (believing the
act is being performed) and “aim-intentional” (believing the outcome will
happen), which explains the Knobe Effect because belief-intentionality is relevant
for moral judgments about bad outcomes and aim-intentionality is relevant for
moral judgments about good outcomes: “[A]gents are generally held to merit
moral praise or credit for bringing about good consequences only if they do so
aim-intentionally”); Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 121 (discussing an
alternative explanation for the Knobe Effect: that for every intentional action,
there must be something that the agent had an intention to do, but to have an
intention to cause a specific outcome, the agent must mean for it to happen);
accord Solan, supra note 39, at 526 (citing a study by Guglielmo and Malle that
used the same scenario involving the CEO and the environment but asked
different questions and found that only 10% of respondents said the CEO
“intentionally harmed” the environment, but 70% said the CEO “intentionally
adopted a profit-raising program that he knew would harm the environment,” and
that the respondents assigned blame to both groups (citation omitted)).
45. Solan, supra note 39, at 522.
46. See infra Part II.C (discussing the hypothesis that the state must condemn
antisocial values).
47. Solan, supra note 39, at 524. In addition, subjective intentions are not
binary but operate on a continuum. See Knobe, supra note 5, at 327 (arguing that
“people’s representation of the agent’s attitude is best understood, not in terms of a
simple dichotomy between ‘in favor’ and ‘not in favor,’ but rather, in terms of a
whole continuum of different attitudes an agent might hold . . . . [P]eople can
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intentions do not indicate intentional action unless they relate to the
morally bad outcome. Sub-baseline intentions about other things—
for example, if the CEO intended to steal her neighbor’s car after
work—do not indicate that she intentionally harmed the
environment.48
Solan’s baseline theory finds support in Knobe’s theory of
alternative possibilities, which are the morally good actions that
people think others should perform and the morally good intentions
they think others should have.49 When a person causes a bad
outcome, people judge her in relation to the good actions and
intentions that they would have expected.50 Thus, moral judgments
about what should have happened influence how people “make
sense” of what actually happened—including whether an action was
intentional.51

represent the agent as strongly opposed, as strongly in favor, or as occupying any
of the various positions in between.”). This notion comports with the Model Penal
Code’s gradations of intent. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0–210.4 (1985).
48. See, Knobe, supra note 5, at 322–23 (citing a study by Keys and Pizarro
that found that even when one person is made to look like a “generally nice
person” and another is made to look like a “generally nasty person,” the Knobe
Effect tracks the morality of the action, not the person).
49. Id. at 326.
50. Id.
51. Id. (“[M]oral considerations are playing a role in people’s way of thinking
about alternative possibilities. Very roughly, people regard certain possibilities as
relevant because they take those possibilities to be especially good or right. With
these thoughts in mind, we can now offer a new explanation for the impact of moral
judgments on people’s intuitions. The basic idea is just that people’s intuitions in all
of the domains we have been discussing—causation, doing/allowing, intentional
action, and so on—rely on a comparison between the actual world and certain
alternative possibilities. Because people’s moral judgments influence the selection of
alternative possibilities, these moral judgments end up having a pervasive impact
on the way people make sense of human beings and their actions.”). As this
passage shows, Knobe’s research may suggest that moral intuitions influence not
only how people perceive intent but also how they perceive causation and
permission. See, e.g., Knobe, supra note 5, at 319 (referencing studies suggesting
that people attribute more causation to the actions of people who did not follow
generally accepted rules than to those who did); Solan, supra note 39, at 530–31
(referencing studies suggesting that people attribute more causation to the actions
of people with morally bad mental states than those with morally good mental
states). While questions of causation and permission are beyond the scope of this
Article, a skewed perception of causation could exacerbate the harshness of felony
murder by punishing not only defendants who lacked the subjective intent to kill
but also those who did not even cause, at least in the traditional sense, the death.
See also Leonard Birdsong, The Felony Murder Doctrine Revisited: A Proposal
for Calibrating Punishment That Reaffirms the Sanctity of Human Life of CoFelons Who Are Victims, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 497, 499 (2007) (arguing that
felony murder should require proof of proximate cause).
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Solan’s baseline theory and Knobe’s alternative possibilities
support the conclusion that felony murder is intentional when the
underlying conduct contradicts the presumption that people intend to
avoid killing other people. For example, a person falls below that
baseline when her conduct demonstrates a disdain for the value of
human life. When her conduct is also felonious and causes a death,
people judge her even more harshly against the alternative
possibilities. Thus, in cases of felony murder, sub-baseline subjective
intentions and worse-than-expected conduct combine with the
extremely bad outcome of death to give people a reason to say
something novel about the defendant’s intent. As with the CEO, they
say the killing was intentional because the conduct, outcome, and
mental state were sufficiently bad.52
Knobe and Solan were not the first to put forward an alternative
theory of intent explaining felony murder. For example, James
Tomkovicz offered this hypothesis in 1994:
There may well be a difference . . . in how those who study
the criminal law and those who elect lawmakers define
accidents. Both groups agree that an innocent driver whose
vehicle malfunctions in a way that was wholly unforeseeable
has killed accidentally. Scholars, however, would say the
same of an individual engaged in a felonious enterprise.
Because the felon was not negligent, his or her killing was
an “accident” by definition. On that point, the public
probably disagrees. “Accidental” means innocent, and
“innocent” means without fault. The public does not
perceive a nonnegligent killing during a felonious endeavor
to be lacking in fault. A person who engages in a criminal
and likely quite immoral act is not “innocent.”53

52. One may ask at this point what distinguishes my version of felony murder
from depraved heart murder, which punishes accidental homicide during the
course of reckless conduct. I suppose it would be fair to say that my version of
felony murder is a subset of depraved heart murder, in that it simply describes
depraved heart murders that occur during a dangerous felony. The requirement of
an underlying felony is important, however, because it ensures that the underlying
conduct, one of Knobe’s three parts of intent, was highly immoral. One presumes
that only the most immoral conduct would cause people to make the highly
unusual statement that one person intentionally killed another, although I know of
no research comparing the badness of the conduct with the tendency to call the
action intentional.
53. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1472 (citation omitted). Of course, the fact
that an action was not accidental does not necessarily mean it was intentional.
However, accidental actions are never intended. Thus, lawmakers’ refusal to view
felonious deaths as accidental makes it easier to call them intentional.
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As this passage demonstrates, a decade before Knobe’s study,
scholars had begun to suggest that popular notions of culpability and
intent were playing a role in felony murder.54 Although Knobe
employs new empirical research to support the claim, the idea is not
new.
In fact, Knobe’s theory parallels the centuries-old concept of
malice aforethought, a traditional element of murder. In the
thirteenth century, malice aforethought did not refer to a subjective
intent to kill or recklessly endanger but “appears to have meant
nothing more definite than a general intention to commit a wrong.”55
As with felony murder, early conceptions of malice aforethought
“clearly included felony killings which were later explained by the
constructive malice doctrine, the forerunner of felony murder.”56 It
thus appears that the law of homicide has always made room for the
notion that a person is guilty of intentionally killing when, instead of
subjectively intending to kill, a dangerous felony causes a death.
On the other hand, modern courts and legislatures have
abandoned the generalized notion of malice in favor of narrowly
defined gradations of intent. If the Knobe Effect simply reflects
outdated sensibilities, then perhaps it is not relevant to contemporary
murder doctrines. Modern criminal law is explicitly based upon
gradations of subjective intent,57 and by moving away from
subjective intent, a conception of felony murder that relies on the
Knobe Effect could appear archaic or backwards.58 On the other

54. Id.
55. Comment, Felony Murder as a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism
Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427, 430 (1957) (citations omitted).
56. Id. (citations omitted) (describing Herbert’s Case as the first ever felony
murder). The “constructive malice” theory holds that certain underlying felonies,
regardless of the defendant’s mental state, make the defendant so culpable that the
state is justified in imputing the mens rea for murder to her. In other words, it acts
as a “mens rea-imposing mechanism,” treating the defendant as though she had
the subjective intent required for murder. See supra note 19 for further discussion.
57. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0–210.4 (1985).
58. In fact, the commenter in the Yale Law Journal who noted the connection
to thirteenth-century malice ultimately concluded that first-degree felony murder
no longer makes sense because first-degree murder requires a subjective intent to
kill. Comment, supra note 55, at 430–32. This notion was first expressed after the
Revolutionary War by the Pennsylvania Legislature, which defined first-degree
murder as willful, premeditated, and deliberate. Id. at 432. Second-degree murder,
on the other hand, may be reckless or negligent, which means that felony murder
must necessarily be in the second degree. Id. at 431–32. This is really just an
argument for the abolition of first-degree felony murder. Of course, felony murder
laws are not based solely on the theory of culpability embodied in Solan’s baseline
but also find support in utilitarian theories and other theories of punishment. See
also infra Part III.C (discussing the possibility that the Knobe Effect is an
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hand, some argue that modern criminal law’s exclusive reliance on
subjective intent fails to adequately account for other indicators of
culpability, especially in felony murder cases.59 Treating some
felony murders as intentional, then, could reconcile the two
positions because both agree that intent demonstrates culpability and
culpability justifies punishment.
B. Retributive Theory: Intent Justifies Murder-Level Punishment
When a killing is intentional, retributivists should support
imposing murder-level punishment because the retributive theory
bases punishment on culpability and culpability on intent.60 To be
sure, some retributivist scholars have argued that intent, for purposes
of determining culpability, refers only to the defendant’s mental
state.61 As David Crump observes, these scholars believe that “mens
rea is the only legitimate determinant of blameworthiness.”62 Indeed,
even when murder statutes do not require a subjective intent to kill—
for example, when murder is based on “gross recklessness . . . of a
sufficient magnitude to evince a callous or depraved indifference to
the value of human life”63—culpability is still determined by the
defendant’s mental state. Nevertheless, retributivist scholars, if
dedicated to the idea that intent determines culpability, should revise
their view of culpability in light of Knobe’s research. If Knobe’s

undesirable part of our psychology that the law should push us to abandon in favor
of more progressive and rational ways of thinking).
59. See generally Crump, supra note 12; Guyora Binder, The Culpability of
Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 975–76 (2008).
60. See Binder, supra note 59; see also id. at 1001 (“[Jeremy] Bentham’s
distinction between motive and intent combines three ideas: (1) the criminal law
should reduce discretion by precisely defining offenses; (2) it should define
offenses in neutral descriptive language rather than normative language; and (3) it
should define culpability by reference to cognitive states like expectations, rather
than desiderative states like purposes.” (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 92 (J.H. Burns
& H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London 1970) (1789)).
61. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1439–40 (arguing that the law
should impose a “gradation [of punishments] proportionate to the established level
of mental fault” (emphasis added)); Binder, supra note 59, at 989 n.109 (citing
Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict
Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84, 101 (1990);
Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 632, 634–37 (1963)).
62. Crump, supra note 12, at 1159.
63. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1439–40.
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theory has truly deepened the meaning of intent,64 then a
defendant’s culpability should be judged by all aspects of such
intent, including conduct and outcomes.65
Some retributivist scholars, in fact, argued for a broader definition
of culpability before the Knobe Effect was discovered. David Crump
and Guyora Binder, for example, argued that a person’s culpability
depends on essentially the same factors that Knobe would use to
describe intent.66 Their position is that conduct and outcomes
demonstrate a person’s culpability,67 which is consistent with
Knobe’s theory that conduct and outcomes demonstrate intent.68
Importantly, by describing the connection between conduct,
outcomes, and culpability, Crump and Binder unknowingly sketched
a framework for restricting felony murder to killings that would be
labeled intentional under Knobe’s theory.
Crump elucidates the pre-Knobe position that culpability depends
on conduct and outcomes:
[T]he drafters [of the Model Penal Code] seem to be saying
that mens rea is the only legitimate determinant of
blameworthiness, [but] the argument rests upon debatable
propositions. . . . The criminal law has never been limited to
mens rea alone in assessing the severity of crime. Actus reus
and results count, too.69
Binder offers a more detailed account of how conduct and
outcomes indicate culpability. He argues that a person’s conduct
“expresses” her values and the resulting outcomes “gratify” them.70
Criminal punishments must therefore address the “expression” and
“gratification” of bad values in the same way that they address
64. See infra Part III.C (discussing whether the Knobe Effect simply
represents a mistaken perception of mental states).
65. It is important to note here that all retributivist laws depend on
perceptions of culpability that are fraught with uncertainty and bias. For example,
hindsight bias and outcome bias make people more likely to say that a traditional
murder defendant subjectively intended to kill or recklessly endanger. See infra
Part III.C. Therefore, even though a felony murder defendant’s perceived
culpability may be fraught with error, such inaccuracies affect traditional murder
convictions as well. Indeed, perhaps they affect traditional murder more than
felony murder because the only way to determine intent in a traditional murder
case is through the impossible task of determining what was going on in the
defendant’s mind.
66. See Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60, 1162; Binder, supra note 59, at
974–75.
67. See Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60, 1162; Binder, supra note 59, at
974–75.
68. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 123–25.
69. Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60, 1162 (citations omitted).
70. Binder, supra note 59, at 1031–33.
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culpable mental states. Binder calls this the “expressive theory” of
culpability.71
Binder rejects the notion that a person’s culpability depends on
her subjective mental state alone—what he calls the “cognitive
view” of culpability:72
A second reason for the persistent view of felony murder as
rationally indefensible is the narrowly cognitive view of
culpability that prevails in contemporary criminal law
theory. According to this view, culpability is purely a
function of the expectation of harm attributable to an actor at
the time he or she acts. Thus, the actor’s purposes, motives,
meanings, and values are irrelevant. In particular, such goals
as completing a rape, demeaning a victim because of her
race, or intimidating political opponents are irrelevant to
culpability for a killing. All that matters is the death and the
expectation of causing it. This cognitive conception of
culpability reflects a restrictive view of the role of criminal
law in a liberal state—as opposing harmful conduct, but
taking no sides in disagreements about values.73
Binder argues that a defendant’s values are an important
indicator of culpability because the state’s social contract with its
citizens requires punishing the expression of bad values. His idea is
based on John Rawls’s theory that the purpose of the state is to
“secure to each individual the broadest sphere of freedom
compatible with like freedom for others.”74 For the state to operate
well, it must ensure that citizens embody the kinds of values that
enhance freedom for everyone. The state therefore cannot remain
neutral toward people who express values contrary to the Rawlsian
social contract. When people express antisocial values through
conduct that causes harm, the state must condemn and punish those
values.75
71. Id. at 974–75.
72. Id. at 970.
73. Id. David Crump agrees with Binder, maintaining that blameworthiness
depends on more than subjective intent. Crump, supra note 12, at 1159 (criticizing
the Model Penal Code because “the drafters seem to be saying that mens rea is the
only legitimate determinant of blameworthiness, that the traditional determinants
of mens rea for murder are the only way to describe the appropriate mental states
for murder . . . . Again, the argument rests upon debatable propositions”).
74. Binder, supra note 59, at 1018–19.
75. Id. at 974–75, 1025, 1032. Binder further argues that the Model Penal
Code’s causation standard reflects the intuition that bad values should be
punished. Id. at 1025, 1032 (“The Model Penal Code causation standard restates
the scope of the risk problem in explicitly normative terms. It asks whether ‘the
actual result differs from the probable [or designed] result only in the respect that a
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Binder posits that even unexpected outcomes affect how much
punishment is deserved. If the person’s conduct expresses bad
values, he says, then a bad outcome strengthens the expression: the
worse the outcome, the stronger the expression of bad values, and
thus more punishment is deserved.76 In this way, the morality of a
defendant’s conduct and the morality of the outcomes it causes
determine culpability. When a defendant’s bad conduct causes a
death, greater punishment is deserved even if the conduct and
mental state are unchanged.77
Binder and Crump agree, therefore, that a properly limited
version of felony murder would be justified under retributive
different person . . . is injured . . . or . . . the actual result involves the same kind of
injury . . . as the probable [or designed] result and is not too remote or accidental
in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the actor’s liability.’ What is the ‘same
kind of injury’? When is the ‘only’ relevant difference between two injuries the
identity of the victim? When is a result not ‘too remote or accidental’ to justly
affect liability? These are obviously normative questions depending in part on our
evaluations of the aims of the actors. . . . [Instead, on my] view, action expresses
value by identifying us with normative social practices. In The Morality of
Freedom, the legal philosopher Joseph Raz denies that our desires determine our
goals, and argues instead that our desires often flow from normative beliefs about
what is best for us. Thus, he contends, we act on the basis of normative reasons or
values, rather than unreflective wants. In Value in Ethics and Economics, the
moral philosopher Elizabeth Anderson offers an institutional account of value as a
social practice of recognizing certain kinds of goods . . . .” (first and second
alterations in original) (citations omitted) (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 288–320 (1986); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND
ECONOMICS 6–7, 11–15 (1993)).
76. Id. at 974. For example, Binder argues that a successful murderer deserves
more punishment than an attempted murderer, even though their conduct
expressed the same bad values. Id. at 1028.
77. Id. at 1037. On the other hand, some say it is irrational to increase
punishment based on bad outcomes. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1471
& n.169 (arguing that an “injury to another person is a weighty factor in the
balances struck by the public. The more serious the injury is, the weightier the
factor is. There is no need to pay a person back or to make a person pay merely
because of the damage done, but damage makes us begin to think along those lines
and generates an inclination to respond. . . . Professor Schulhofer refers to [this
response] as ‘retaliation.’ Others have called it ‘expiation’ and ‘vengeance.’
Whatever its name, the public possesses a certain attachment to the concept. That
attachment is part of the substructure of the felony-murder rule.” (citing Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1571 (1974); David
Crump & Susan W. Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 368 (1985); Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law
Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1932 (1986))); see also infra Part
III.C.3 (discussing whether the Knobe Effect is simply evidence of a
predisposition to blame people who cause bad outcomes, regardless of whether
they are culpable).
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theory.78 Binder argues from his expressive theory, contending that
a defendant who causes a death in the course of an inherently
dangerous felony deserves to be punished as a murderer because the
dangerous conduct, combined with the outcome of death, expresses
antisocial values as strongly as, if not more strongly than, traditional
murder.79 Crump similarly argues that felony murder is a necessary
part of the criminal law because traditional murder, which cannot
impose murder-level punishment without proof of subjective intent,
does not account for the full range of factors that determine
culpability, including conduct and outcomes.80 Crump thus argues
that felony murder “may actually serve the policy of linking the
criminal law to moral blameworthiness.”81
Building upon Crump and Binder, I propose that the best way to
restrict felony murder to defendants who are as culpable as
traditional murderers is to confine it to cases in which the killing
would be called intentional under Knobe’s theory. Felony murder
would thus fill a gap in homicide schemes, addressing the set of
intentional killings not covered by traditional murder while also
eliminating instances in which less culpable defendants are punished
too harshly. If such a rule is desirable, then the next question is how
to structure it to apply only to intentional killings.
C. Restricting Felony Murder to Intentional Killings
Although Knobe’s theory suggests that felony murder
sometimes involves intentional killings, certainly not all deaths that
occur during the commission of a felony are intentional. As
78. See generally Crump, supra note 12; Binder, supra note 59.
79. See generally Binder, supra note 59.
80. See generally Crump, supra note 12.
81. Id. at 1162. Moreover, culpability should perhaps not depend exclusively
on the actor’s subjective intent, especially in light of studies showing that
perceptions of others’ mental states are inherently flawed. See, e.g., Christopher
Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 146 (2005)
(“[E]xperience and research demonstrate that judicial and jury conclusions about
core culpability concepts such as premeditation, recklessness, and insanity differ
significantly across individuals and across juries. Given this unreliability, many of
these conclusions about blameworthiness cannot possibly achieve the 90 to 95
percent degree of accuracy normally associated with the reasonable doubt
standard. That should not be surprising, given the ill-defined scope of legal mental
states and the difficulty of investigating subjective beliefs and desires. But it is
disturbing because these unreliable assessments can spell the difference between a
conviction for manslaughter and eligibility for the death penalty, or between a
prison term and indeterminate institutionalization in a mental hospital.” (citations
omitted)); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the possibility that the Knobe Effect
does not affect the meaning of intent but is merely evidence of the inability to
perceive others’ subjective intentions).
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described above, a killing cannot be considered intentional under
Knobe’s theory unless the killer exhibits sub-baseline intentions
regarding the death. Unrelated intentions, even if morally bad, are
not relevant.82 Thus, purely unforeseeable or accidental killings
should not be considered felony murder because they exhibit no subbaseline intentions regarding the death. In this respect, Crump and
Binder are instructive once again. By devising ways to limit felony
murder to actions that demonstrate murder-level culpability, they
unknowingly provide a framework for limiting the rule to killings
that would be considered intentional under Knobe’s theory.
Binder would limit felony murder to cases involving inherently
dangerous felonies.83 Under his “expressive theory,” a felony
murder conviction is not justified unless the defendant harbored bad
values that were “indulged” or “gratified” by the death.84 He
therefore argues that only inherently dangerous felonies, such as
those in which the defendant “uses fatal violence to coerce a
victim’s cooperation or overcome her resistance during a crime like
rape or robbery,” express and gratify such bad values.85
Most states appear to agree with Binder on this point. As of
2005, 35 states had restricted felony murder to a list of felonies that
pose the greatest risk to life.86 When a death results from one of
82. See infra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Knobe, supra note 5,
at 323 (describing a 2009 study suggesting that the perception of intent is tied to
the morality of conduct, not blame for the resultant outcome).
83. Binder, supra note 59, at 988. This limitation makes sense considering the
way in which he connects culpability to outcomes:
If we punished attempts and completed crimes equally, successful
offenders would be left more satisfied than unsuccessful attempters.
Their regret at having been caught and punished would be mitigated by
their pleasure in having achieved their criminal aims. From this
viewpoint, we are obliged to punish the successful wrongdoer more
than the attempter lest we become complicit in his self-indulgence by
permitting his undeserved gratification. This is, in my view, a very
strong argument that punishing harm is deserved.
Id. at 1028 (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 1027–29, 1039–40.
85. Id. at 1037, 1045–46. An obvious counterargument is that, even if a
defendant decided to expose someone to a risk of death to perpetrate a rape or
robbery, the lack of subjective intent to kill means that the death did not gratify the
defendant’s values, at least not to the extent that Binder suggests.
86. Birdsong, supra note 10, at 21 & n.140. See also Tomkovicz, supra note
12, at 1467; Crump, supra note 12. Birdsong and Crump agree with this view of
felony murder, arguing that the sanctity of human life is the most important value
underlying the felony murder rule. Birdsong, supra note 51, at 499, 506 (“[S]tates
might wish to choose to amend their felony murder statutes in an effort to
effectuate the proximate cause theory of liability. Such an approach could prove to
be a better way to calibrate punishment in a proportionate way that would value
the lives of co-felons who are victims. Such calibration would better serve to deter

2013]

INTENTIONAL KILLING

1031

those felonies, it is easier to say that the defendant expressed disdain
for human life.87 Furthermore, as Crump observes, the fact that a
majority of states limits felony murder to inherently dangerous
felonies shows that the version of the rule commonly criticized by
scholars—the version that punishes “any felony that results however
unpredictably in a death”—is not representative of the general
rule.88
Crump, similar to Binder, would limit felony murder to crimes
committed in a manner “clearly dangerous to human life.”89 This
formulation attempts to restrict murder-level punishment to cases in
which the defendant’s conduct expressed a high level of disdain for
human life.90 The difference is that Crump does not use a

felons who might kill while also reaffirming the sanctity of human life, even the
life of co-felons who may be killed. . . . Under the proximate cause theory, liability
attaches for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity, though it
is most often applied in those states that follow the enumerated felonies that are
inherently dangerous to life approach to felony murder.” (citation omitted)). See
also Crump, supra note 12, at 1163 (“The rule also performs a function involving
condemnation, because it reaffirms the sanctity of human life by reserving severe
sanctions for crimes that destroy human life.” (citation omitted)). Though the
sanctity of human life may not be essential to the Rawlsian social contract, it is
nevertheless important for the law to uphold. Maximizing freedom and social
good for all citizens, moreover, arguably depends on everyone’s right to remain
alive.
87. Indeed, the earliest forms of felony murder did not encompass accidental
killings. Binder, supra note 20, at 202 (“Apart from one case predicated on a
bungled suicide and four cases predicated on putatively consensual abortions,
none of the known felony murders punished in nineteenth-century America could
plausibly be described as accidental. In almost all of these cases, death resulted
from the deliberate infliction of violence.”). See also Karen M. Quinn, Case Note,
Criminal Law—A Reckless Indifference to Human Life Is Sufficient Evidence to
Prove Culpability in a Felony-Murder Case and Therefore Imposition of the
Death Penalty Is Not a Violation of the Eighth Amendment—Tison v. Arizona, 107
S. Ct. 1676 (1987), 37 DRAKE. L. REV. 767 (1988). Quinn points out that reckless
indifference is enough to justify the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment
ruling in Tison v. Arizona. Id. at 776 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676,
1684–68 (1987) (holding that the possibility of killing someone is inherent in the
commission of any violent felony and thus one can say that all violent felons
constructively foresee a killing)). Donald Baier thus argues that Tison makes the
most sense when felony murder is limited to inherently dangerous felonies or
felonies committed in clearly dangerous ways, which is consistent with Crump
and Binder. Donald Baier, Note, Arizona Felony Murder: Let the Punishment Fit
the Crime, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 705–07 (1994).
88. Crump, supra note 12, at 1176–77. Of course, individual judges and
prosecutors may ignore such limiting language.
89. Id. at 1171.
90. Id. at 1166 (arguing that restricting felony murder to crimes committed in
ways that are clearly dangerous to human life “ties the crime of murder to
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predetermined list of “inherently dangerous” felonies because even
those felonies are sometimes committed in ways not clearly
dangerous to human life.91 Crump’s formulation thus attempts to
tailor felony murder to cases in which the defendant actually
expressed disdain for human life.92
Perhaps Crump’s formulation finds the most support in Knobe’s
theory. One can be relatively certain that when a defendant commits
a felony in a way that is “clearly dangerous to human life,” her
subjective intentions regarding the risk of death fall below Solan’s
baseline. Simply, she does not care enough about endangering
others’ lives. Thus, when she ends up killing a person in the course
of the felony, Knobe’s theory would label the killing intentional.93
Binder’s formulation, on the other hand, is less precise because
there is no felony that endangers human life every time it is
committed.94 Some felonies tend to be more dangerous than others,
and those are typically included on states’ lists of “inherently”
dangerous felonies, but there are always some cases in which those
crimes—even armed robbery or violent rape—are committed
without actually endangering human life.95 Even so, merely
deciding to commit a felony that carries a high risk of being

relatively high degrees of individual blameworthiness”). But see Tamu Sudduth,
Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding Proportionate Felony-Murder
Punishments, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1320–22, 1326 (1984) (arguing that the felony
murder rule would be unnecessary if all homicides were punished in proportion to
the degree of disdain for human life expressed by the crime: “If the totality of the
circumstances surrounding a homicide indicates that the defendant consciously
subjected a human life to unreasonable risk, then murder-level punishment is
justified. If the defendant’s conduct does not suggest a recklessness or an intent to
kill, then the defendant’s culpability is insufficient to invoke murder penalties.”).
91. Crump, supra note 12, at 1166, 1171 (criticizing California’s felony
murder law, which is limited to inherently dangerous felonies in the abstract: “The
principal limitation upon the felony murder rule in California is the ‘inherently
dangerous felony’ requirement. This concept differs sharply from the ‘clearly
dangerous act’ requirement in the state statute discussed above. In California, the
relevant question is whether the felony ‘in the abstract’ is inherently dangerous.
This formulation is subject to criticism because it divorces the definition of murder
from the individual blameworthiness of the defendant. . . . But that is not all. The
California court has had a great deal of trouble deciding precisely which felonies
are ‘dangerous.’” (citations omitted)).
92. Id. at 1166.
93. But see supra Part II.B for a discussion of whether legal culpability has
traditionally been determined by intent qua mental state or as defined more
broadly by Knobe.
94. See Crump, supra note 12, at 1166, 1175.
95. Id.
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dangerous to human life likely reveals subjective intentions below
Solan’s baseline.96
Perhaps lawmakers could combine the theories of Binder and
Crump to ensure that felony murder covers only intentional killings.
Restricting felony murder to situations in which both conditions are
satisfied—in which the crime is on the list of inherently dangerous
felonies and was committed in a manner clearly dangerous to human
life—would best ensure that the defendant had the kinds of subbaseline intentions that, along with morally bad conduct and
outcomes, indicate that the killing was intentional. In this way,
properly restricted felony murder laws could single out defendants
deserving of murder-level punishment and thus find support in
retributive theory.97
96. For a list of state laws that restrict felony murder to a predetermined set of
crimes typically dangerous to human life, see Birdsong, supra note 10, at 21
n.140. Of course, one can question whether the crimes included on the list are, in
fact, dangerous enough to merit inclusion. Additionally, Binder would modify the
felony murder rule based on the values of each jurisdiction. See Binder, supra note
20, at 201–05. That is, the extent to which a certain value is “antisocial” and
deserving of punishment depends on the particular values of the locale. Id. A
related issue in this context is how felony murder might vary across jurisdictions
with different values. Could a homicide be intentional in one jurisdiction but not
another? Perhaps this problem suggests a need for further research regarding how
the Knobe Effect operates across different cultures and demographics. Such
research is in its infancy. One study suggests that the Knobe Effect operates in the
Hindi language but not necessarily in India itself (the subjects of the study were in
the United States). Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 126–29. Another study,
unpublished, suggests that the Knobe Effect may be weaker among AsianAmerican males. See Lawrence Ngo, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Scott Hueteel,
Individual Differences in the Knobe Effect and Experimental Philosophy (2011)
(unpublished study). Moreover, it would appear difficult to discern whether the
relevant subset is geographic or demographic (or both). Binder would choose
geography, arguing that the relevant values are those expressed by the law of each
jurisdiction. Binder, supra note 20, at 207 (“One function of a felony murder rule,
then, is to work in conjunction with other rules of criminal liability to map a
particular society’s moral intuitions about violence and malice. This means that
there can be no universally valid answer to the question of the justice of ‘the’
felony murder rule. Instead, we must evaluate each felony murder rule as it is
defined and put into practice in a particular jurisdiction, in a particular legal and
cultural context.”). See also Daniel J. Abbott, A Comparative Analysis of Felony
Murder in Developed and Under-Developed Nations (Am. Soc’y of Criminology,
Annual Meeting Presentation, Oct. 30–Nov. 2, 1975).
97. This restriction also appears to track the traditional definition of malice
aforethought. See Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1439 n.38 (“The traditional and
still common definition of murder is a killing with malice aforethought. The
essence of malice is this ‘callous or depraved indifference to human life.’
Intentional or knowing killings qualify as murders because they satisfy this
minimum essence. In fact, they entail even more culpability than the minimum
indifference. Grossly reckless killings also satisfy this minimum threshold for
malice.” (citations omitted)).
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Although some felony murders would be considered intentional
under Knobe’s theory, limiting the rule to such cases would not
necessarily satisfy retributivist critics. As explained by Tomkovicz
and Judge Rudolph Gerber, felony murder suffers from particular
deficiencies that may not be remedied by restricting it to intentional
killings. Additionally, Knobe’s theory may suggest that a killing
was not intentional unless the killer foresaw or desired the death,
which would drastically reduce the percentage of intentional felony
murders. Finally, some researchers argue that the Knobe Effect has
no bearing on the meaning of intent and simply represents a
mistaken perception of mental states. If this is true, then felony
murders are never intentional, and Knobe’s theory cannot answer
retributivist critics at all.
A. Felony Murder Is Especially Corrupt and Unfair
If felony murder operates in especially unfair or corrupt ways,
then it may not be justifiable even when restricted to intentional
killings. Rudolph Gerber, a judge on the Arizona Supreme Court,
argues that the felony murder rule is corrupted by politics and unfair
to individual defendants.98 He maintains that while society may feel
a need to condemn antisocial values (as Binder would argue), it is
fundamentally unfair to heap society’s hatred for crime onto a few
unfortunate individuals.99 The nature of the political process
exacerbates the problem, he says, because the defendant’s status as a
felon encourages lawmakers and judges to impose excessive
punishment: “By objectifying the [felon] as nothing more than an
undeserving criminal, lawmakers find it easier to aggravate
punishment even to death, no matter the price of caprice.”100
Tomkovicz levies a similar charge, arguing that felony murder’s
unfairness stems from the political process.101 Legislatures and
98. See generally Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum
Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763 (1999). Judge Gerber does not mention
Binder’s expressive theory, but his arguments are directly relevant. See id.
99. Id. at 782–84.
100. Id. at 783 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Note, Felony Murder:
A Tort Law Reconceptualization, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1918, 1931 (1986)). Gerber’s
argument could be seen as a criticism of Solan’s baseline theory. As Solan
hypothesized, people would call a homicide intentional if it involved conduct
exhibiting sub-baseline intentions regarding the possibility of death. Gerber’s
response would be that it is unfair to apply different rules to people who fall below
the baseline, especially considering that felony defendants are “the very ones who
need to learn something about principle.” Id. at 782–84.
101. Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1461–63.

2013]

INTENTIONAL KILLING

1035

judges, he says, feel pressure to placate a populace that does not care
about treating felons fairly.102 This pressure often overrides their
ability to maintain “consistency and fairness” when charging and
punishing felony murder defendants:103
The demand for “law and order” strikes an emotional chord
in America. One can hardly be elected to public office
without embracing the concept wholeheartedly. . . .
[A]nyone bent on reforming the [felony murder] rule must
fight the tide and be prepared to pay a political price. In the
world of American politics, logical consistency and fairness
to felons are not very potent weapons against the charge that
one is soft on crime and hostile to law and order. . . .
[P]robably inextricable from the public consciousness is the
idea that felons—by virtue of their choices to engage in
felonies—have effectively forfeited any entitlement to close
scrutiny of their blameworthiness.104
While these complaints may ring true in jurisdictions that treat
purely accidental killings as murder,105 Knobe’s theory, again, does
not support such an expansive rule. Knobe’s theory requires that the
defendant demonstrate sub-baseline intentions regarding the
victim’s life before the killing can be called intentional.106 The
“accidental death” version of felony murder thus finds no support in
Knobe’s theory because purely accidental killings should not be
called intentional.
Moreover, the principal case cited by Judge Gerber, People v.
Aaron,107 actually supports the limited versions of felony murder
suggested by Crump and Binder. While Aaron technically abrogated
felony murder in Michigan, it expressly sanctioned murder-level
punishment for defendants who unintentionally killed while
committing felonies that exhibited disdain for human life.108 The
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1461–63, 1475 (citations omitted).
105. See Gerber, supra note 98, at 763, 765, 767, 771, 778, 782–83;
Tomkovicz, supra note 12, at 1438, 1444, 1449, 1472–73.
106. See supra Part II.C.
107. Gerber, supra note 98, at 784 (citing People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304,
327 (Mich. 1980)).
108. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 327 (Mich. 1980) (noting that “in
many circumstances the commission of a felony, particularly one involving
violence or the use of force, will indicate an intention to kill, an intention to cause
great bodily harm, or wanton or willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural
tendency of defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Thus, the
felony-murder rule is not necessary to establish mens rea in these cases”). See also
Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60, 1164.

1036

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

court observed that in such cases, felony murder is irrelevant
because the state can prove the intent required for murder.109
Knobe’s theory, in accordance with 35 states, says essentially the
same thing: A killing is not intentional unless the conduct and
outcomes are morally bad (as in all cases of felony murder) and the
defendant exhibits sub-baseline intentions regarding the death (as in
the formulations suggested by Crump and Binder). It is thus mostly
a question of semantics whether Aaron “abrogated” felony murder
or simply changed it to the version suggested by Crump and
Binder.110 In this way, Knobe’s theory suggests that felony murder
is not necessarily “unfair” or “capricious” but is consistent, when
properly restricted, with the meaning of intent.
B. Knobe’s Theory Does Not Apply to Unforeseen Outcomes
According to some experts, the Knobe Effect occurs only when
the actor knows that she will cause the relevant outcome.111 If this is
true, then Knobe’s theory may be irrelevant to most felony murders
because, in most cases, the defendant did not know that her conduct
would cause a death.112
Al Mele and Paul Moser argue that when a person does not
believe she is in control of causing an outcome, it makes no sense to
say she intended it.113 Thomas Nadelhoffer explains their argument
in this way:
On [their] view, skill and control are necessary conditions of
our everyday concept of intentional action . . . . [For example,
in a scenario in which Lisa and Mike roll a winning number
with a pair of dice], Mele and Moser claim that . . . neither
Lisa nor Mike performed their respective actions intentionally
because in both cases the actions were not the result of any
relevant skill on their part—i.e., their actions were simply the
fortunate result of chance or luck.114
Frank Hindriks agrees with Mele and Moser, arguing that the
Knobe Effect occurs only when the person foresees the morally
109. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 327.
110. Id.; Crump, supra note 12, at 1159–60, 1164.
111. See generally Knobe, supra note 5 (summarizing various studies and
debates about the Knobe Effect, all of which deal with scenarios in which the actor
foresaw the outcome).
112. I know of no study examining the percentage of felony murder cases in
which the defendant knew that her action would cause a death, but I presume it is
small.
113. Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 341, 344.
114. Id.

2013]

INTENTIONAL KILLING

1037

relevant outcome.115 The Knobe Effect, he says, is simply a
condemnation of the person’s failure to avoid foreseen negative
consequences:116
[F]oresight betrays a guilty mind as much as intent does:
both reveal that the agent is not properly motivated to avoid
an illegal state of affairs. This commonality warrants our
judgment that the state is brought about intentionally, even
when unintended. In contrast to Knobe, I thus retain the idea
that acting intentionally is acting with a certain frame of
mind.117
If these researchers are correct, then perhaps Knobe’s theory is
irrelevant to most felony murder cases. Like Lisa and Mike, most
felony murderers do not believe that their conduct will cause the
relevant outcome (death). Instead, the death, like the roll of the dice,
involves a significant amount of luck. A recent study, however,
suggests that the Knobe Effect may actually occur even when the
actor does not know or believe that her conduct will cause the
relevant outcome.118 If this is true—if the Knobe Effect extends this
far—then perhaps Knobe’s theory does speak to unforeseen
killings.119
The study asked participants to examine four hypothetical
scenarios and evaluate whether the person in each acted
intentionally.120 The scenarios involved a morally good outcome
accomplished by skill, a morally good outcome resulting from luck,
a morally bad outcome accomplished by skill, and a morally bad
outcome resulting from luck.121 Briefly, the scenarios involved Jake
shooting a rifle. The morally good outcome was that he shot a
bull’s-eye and won a contest. The morally bad outcome was that he
shot his aunt to hasten his inheritance. To base the outcome on skill,
115. Knobe, supra note 5, at 339.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 341, 345–46. As Nadelhoffer says, “[S]ome
simple psychological experiments . . . show that people’s judgments concerning
whether actions are intentional can often be affected by the moral features of these
actions—features that may trump considerations of skill, luck, and control.
Finally, I conclude that if this is correct, philosophers who claim that skill and
control are necessary conditions . . . of intentional action appear to be mistaken.”
Id. at 341.
119. Crump agrees that felony murder should not be restricted to cases in
which the defendant subjectively believed that her conduct was likely to cause a
death because other kinds of murder do not require such precise subjective
intent—for example, “depraved heart” murder. Crump, supra note 12, at 1168.
120. Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 345–46.
121. Id.
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the hypothetical stipulated that he was an expert marksman. To base
it on luck, it stipulated that he had never fired a gun before.122
The remarkable results involve Jake’s lucky shots. Even though
he did not foresee the consequences of his conduct—having never
fired a gun before, he did not believe he could hit his aunt or the
bull’s-eye—participants in the study called his action intentional
more often when the outcome was morally bad.123 Seventy-six
percent of participants said he intentionally shot his aunt, while only
28% said he intentionally shot the bull’s-eye.124 These results
suggest that the Knobe Effect occurs even when the actor does not
know that her conduct will cause the relevant outcome.125
On the other hand, Jake hoped that he would hit the targets and
knew that doing so was possible.126 Although he did not believe that
he would hit either target, he knew that they would be in his line of
fire and that he could hit them by chance.127 Thus, although the
study suggests that the Knobe Effect occurs even when the person
does not foresee the relevant outcome, it says nothing about
situations in which the person has no idea that the outcome is
122. Id. Nadelhoffer describes the scenarios like this: “(1A): Achievement/Skill:
Jake desperately wants to win a rifle contest. He knows that he will only win the
contest if he hits the bull’s-eye. He raises the rifle, gets the bull’s-eye in the sights,
and presses the trigger. Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady. The gun
is aimed perfectly. The bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye. Jake wins the
contest. (1B): Achievement/No Skill: Jake desperately wants to win a rifle contest.
He knows that he will only win the contest if he hits the bull’s-eye. He raises the
rifle, gets the bull’s-eye in the sights, and presses the trigger. But Jake isn’t very
good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes
wild. Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly on the bull’s-eye. Jake wins the
contest. (2A): Immoral/Skill: Jake desperately wants to have more money. He
knows that he will inherit a lot of money when his aunt dies. One day, he sees his
aunt walking by the window. Jake is an expert marksman. His hands are steady.
The gun is aimed perfectly. The bullet hits her directly in the heart. She dies
instantly. (2B): Immoral/No Skill: Jake desperately wants to have more money. He
knows that he will inherit a lot of money when his aunt dies. One day, he sees his
aunt walking by the window. But Jake isn’t very good at using his rifle. His hand
slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild. Nonetheless, the bullet hits
her directly in the heart. She dies instantly. . . . Each subject was presented with
one of these four vignettes along with the following question: ‘Did Jake
intentionally kill his aunt [hit the bull’s-eye]?’” Id. at 345 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
123. Id. at 345–46.
124. Id. at 346. Unsurprisingly, the skillful scenarios also exhibited the Knobe
Effect. When Jake was an expert marksman, 95% of respondents said he shot his
aunt intentionally, whereas only 79% said he shot the bulls-eye intentionally. Id.
125. The percentages in this study were similar to Knobe’s original study, in
which participants perceived intent 87% of the time for the bad outcome and 20%
of the time for the good outcome. Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at 118.
126. See Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 345
127. See id.
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possible or does not desire it.128 If the Knobe Effect does not apply
in those situations, then it may not apply in many felony murder
cases because most defendants probably did not hope to kill and
may not have known that death was even a possibility. As of this
writing, no studies have tested whether the Knobe Effect applies in
such situations.129
C. The Knobe Effect Represents a Mistaken Perception
Some argue that the Knobe Effect represents a mistaken
perception of mental states. On this view, morally bad conduct and
outcomes cause observers to mistakenly conclude that bad outcomes
were subjectively intended.130 If the Knobe Effect simply reflects
this error, then Knobe’s theory cannot provide a rational restriction
on felony murder and may actually support abolishing it to the
128. Cf. FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 83
(1958) (arguing that “trying” and “intending” are equivalent).
129. On the other hand, one might say that committing a felony, or at least a
dangerous felony, implies some level of awareness that someone’s life is being
endangered. See supra Part II.C. Additionally, building upon the study involving
Jake, Nadelhoffer conducted another study involving a hypothetical actor named
Fred, an employee at a nuclear reactor who luckily guesses the numbers of a
crucial code. Not surprisingly, when Fred correctly guessed the code to cause a
bad result, observers rated his action as very intentional, but when he correctly
guessed the code to cause a good result, observers rated his action as less
intentional. Nadelhoffer, supra note 4, at 347–49. The study also evaluated two
other dimensions: the extent to which observers praised or blamed Fred for the
result and the distinction between whether he intentionally guessed the right
numbers or intentionally caused the ultimate result. Id. The results of
Nadelhoffer’s study are as follows. When Fred guessed the code to prevent an
imminent meltdown of the nuclear reactor, the responses were thus:
Q1: 38% said Fred punched in the correct numbers intentionally.
Q2: The average praise rating was 3.0 on a 6-point scale.
Q3: 73% said Fred intentionally prevented the explosion.
Q4: The average praise rating was 4.0 on a 6-point scale. Id. at 347.
Yet when he guessed the code to destroy the plant, the results were thus:
Q1: 67% said that Fred intentionally punched in the correct numbers.
Q2: The average blame rating was 5.23 on a 6-point scale.
Q3: 83% said that Fred intentionally caused the explosion.
Q4: The average blame rating was 5.31 on a 6-point scale. Id. at 348.
Interestingly, when the moral element of the scenario was removed, the
participants in the study were much less likely to call the action intentional. Id. at
348–49. That is, when Fred guessed the code to win the lottery, the results were:
Q1: 80% said that Fred did not intentionally punch in the correct
numbers.
Q2: 67% said that Fred did not intentionally win the lottery. Id. at 349.
130. See, e.g., Knobe, supra note 5, at 321–24; Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts,
Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror
Impartiality, 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 203, 205–06 (2006).
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extent it depends on the mistake. There are at least three ways in
which the Knobe Effect could represent a mistaken perception of
mental states: It may be infected by hindsight bias, motivational
bias, and outcome bias. I use the term “infected” because these
biases, although they contribute to the Knobe Effect, are likely not
its sole cause. Even so, such problems would undermine the
argument that felony murder deals with intentional killings.131
1. Hindsight Bias
Hindsight bias, perhaps the simplest of the three biases, may
infect both Knobe’s theory and felony murder. Generally speaking,
hindsight bias is “the phenomenon that people overestimate the
predictability of past events.”132 According to Martin Lijtmaer,
hindsight bias stems from the psychological need to make sense of
past events:
[W]hen people know an outcome, they naturally integrate the
events leading to that outcome into a coherent story. In the
process of constructing this narrative, people mentally
emphasize certain circumstances that support the development
of the known outcome while downplaying other circumstances
that would have led to alternative plausible outcomes.133
As it relates to Knobe’s theory, hindsight bias may cause people
to overestimate the predictability of morally bad outcomes, thus
leading them too often to conclude that they were subjectively
intended.134 An observer, believing that a person foresaw the
131. A fourth bias is the “Actor-Observer Bias,” which suggests that people
“hold other[s] to different moral standards than [they] would hold [themselves]
even if [they] were in the same situation.” See Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz,
The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to SinnottArmstrong’s Fire, 1 NEUROETHICS 133, 133 (2008). Because the Actor–Observer
Bias is very general and broadly applicable, I do not discuss it in detail. However,
as in any judgment about culpability or intent, the Actor–Observer Bias likely
plays a role in felony murder cases.
132. Martin Lijtmaer, The Felony Murder Rule in Illinois: The Injustice of the
Proximate Cause Theory Explored Via Research in Cognitive Psychology, 98 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 638 (2008) (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571
(1998)).
133. Lijtmaer, supra note 132, at 639 (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 584
(1998)).
134. This problem also affects the primary utilitarian justification for felony
murder (that it deters people from committing felonies that they know will
endanger someone’s life) because observers likely overestimate the foreseeability
of the danger. See, e.g., Baier, supra note 87, at 712–13 (citing 2 FRANCIS
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consequences of her actions, might conclude that she subjectively
intended them, but if the perception of foresight is incorrect, then the
attribution of intent is incorrect as well.
Hindsight bias could thus undermine felony murder’s
retributivist justification. Lijtmaer explains that hindsight bias
increases felony murder punishments by making juries “more likely
to conclude that a death occurring during the course of a felony was
foreseeable.”135 The Knobe Effect would exacerbate this problem by
leading people to believe that the death was not only foreseeable but
also intentional.
On the other hand, the problem of hindsight bias may simply
suggest that states should use Binder’s formulation of felony murder
instead of Crump’s. Recall that Crump’s formulation restricts felony
murder to crimes committed in ways that are “clearly dangerous to
human life,” whereas Binder’s uses a predetermined list of
“inherently dangerous” felonies.136 I argued that Crump’s
formulation was better at ensuring that each defendant actually had
sub-baseline intentions regarding the death,137 but Crump’s
formulation would seem more prone to hindsight bias because it
requires people to judge whether an action that caused a death was
“clearly dangerous to human life.” Because of the outcome, people
will conclude too often that it was.
Binder’s formulation may therefore better avoid hindsight bias
in that restricting felony murder to a predetermined list of felonies
removes the biased judgment from the equation. For example, no
matter how strongly jurors believed that an online hacker intended
to give her victim a heart attack, they could not convict her of felony
murder if cybercrimes were not on the list of inherently dangerous
felonies (as one would hope). Again, to offer maximum protection
to defendants, lawmakers should probably adopt both Binder’s and
Crump’s limitations, requiring that the underlying felony be
included on the predetermined list and be perceived as having been
committed in a way that was “clearly dangerous to human life.”
That combination would help to counteract hindsight bias and
ensure that the rule punishes only intentional killings.

WHARTON, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW 208 (1979); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 464 (1987)). Hindsight bias, however, could
suggest that people overestimate the foreseeability of the death, thus weakening
the deterrence rationale.
135. Id. at 645. If the death was foreseeable, then the defendant is presumably
more culpable, although Lijtmaer does not make this connection.
136. See supra Part II.C.
137. See supra Part II.C.
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2. Motivational Bias
Similar to hindsight bias, motivational bias may suggest that the
Knobe Effect represents a mistaken perception of mental states.
Motivational bias is the phenomenon that people are motivated to
attribute subjective intent to a person who caused a bad outcome.138
When observers feel that the person who caused the outcome
deserves blame for it, they are motivated to conclude that she
subjectively intended it.139 The Knobe Effect could thus be a result of
an unjustified inclination to blame.140
Knobe describes the psychological mechanism of motivational
bias as an interaction between blame and the perception of subjective
intent. Rather than leading directly from blame to intent, there is “a
reciprocal relationship between people’s blame judgments and their
intuitions about intention.”141 After initially feeling that a person is to
blame, the observer reinterprets the situation to make the person
138. Knobe, supra note 5, at 321–24.
139. Id. This phenomenon has also been described in terms of the need to be
seen as blaming the person for the morally bad outcome. See, e.g., Knobe &
Burra, supra note 1, at 119–20 (citing F. Adams & A. Steadman, Intentional
Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?, 64
ANALYSIS 173–81 (2004); F. Adams & A. Steadman, Intentional Action and
Moral Consequences: Still Pragmatic, 64 ANALYSIS 268–76 (2004)). In other
words, the Knobe Effect might be explained by the desire to avoid being seen as
letting a person off the hook for causing a morally bad outcome. Id. People would
say that an action was intentional to make sure they are perceived as properly
condemning the bad outcome. Id.
140. Knobe, supra note 5, at 321–24. Studies suggest that the Knobe Effect is
not based on emotion, however. A study by Young showed that people who have
lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (which means they have little or no
emotional response) nonetheless exhibit the Knobe Effect. Id. at 322 (citing L.
Young et al., Does Emotion Mediate the Effect of an Action’s Moral Status on its
Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence, 6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE
291–304 (2006)). In fact, people with these lesions exhibited the Knobe Effect
more strongly, attributing intent to the CEO who causes harm to the environment
100% of the time (whereas only 87% of participants in the original study
attributed intent in this scenario). Id. See also Knobe & Burra, supra note 1, at
117–18. Additionally, a study by Keys and Pizarro found that even when one actor
is made to look like a “generally nice person” and another is made to look like a
“generally nasty person,” the Knobe Effect continues to track the morality of the
outcome, not the person. Knobe, supra note 5, at 322–23. An emotion-free Knobe
Effect, however, would not necessarily exclude motivational bias because
immediate moral appraisals can happen without any emotion at all. Id. at 322. But
see Nadelhoffer, supra note 130, at 205–06 (citing “affective model[s] of moral
psychology,” which hold that “emotional and non-rational processes, rather than
deliberative and rational ones, are primarily responsible for our moral judgments”).
Of course, the intersection of emotion, cognition, and moral judgments is a rich field,
and space limitations preclude anything near a complete treatment.
141. Knobe, supra note 5, at 321.
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appear more blameworthy and then feels even more strongly that the
person is to blame. The observer then reinterprets the situation again
to further justify the feeling. Any one of these reinterpretations, or a
few of them in sequence, can make it seem as though the person
subjectively intended the bad outcome.142 In this way, the initial
desire to blame sets off a series of reinterpretations that lead
observers to conclude, more often than they should, that bad
outcomes were caused intentionally.143
If the Knobe Effect is caused by motivational bias, then it does
not suggest that felony murder can actually be restricted to
intentional killings. The knee-jerk feeling that a person is to blame is
not a rational way to evaluate intent. Retributive theory requires
specific indicators of culpability to authorize punishment.144
Knobe, however, rejects the argument that motivational bias
underlies the Knobe Effect. In fact, he argues that the Knobe Effect
has nothing to do with blame.145 He cites a study involving two
hypothetical situations: one in which morally bad conduct caused a
morally good outcome, and one in which morally good conduct
caused a morally good outcome. Because both outcomes were good,
there was no need to blame. Nevertheless, people were more likely
to call the action intentional when the conduct was bad.146
This study suggests that judgments about conduct, more so than
outcomes, affect the perception of intent. As Knobe says, “the data
don’t actually suggest that people’s causal intuitions are being
influenced by a judgment that the agent is to blame for the outcome.
Instead, the data appear to suggest that these intuitions are being
influenced by a judgment that the agent’s action itself is bad.”147
142. Id.
143. As Nadelhoffer says, “[J]udgments concerning the moral blameworthiness
or praiseworthiness of agents can have a similar influence on our ascriptions of
intentional action.” Nadelhoffer, supra note 130, at 205 (citation omitted). The
theory of motivational bias is also supported by a “growing body of evidence
suggesting that people often adopt certain views as part of a post hoc attempt to
justify prior moral intuitions.” Knobe, supra note 5, at 321 (citing P. Ditto et al.,
Motivated Moral Reasoning, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND
MOTIVATION 307 (D.M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009); J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog
and Its Rational Tail: A Social Institutional Approach to Moral Judgment, 108
PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001)).
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. Knobe, supra note 5, at 322 (citing C. Hitchcock & J. Knobe, Cause and
Norm, 106 J. PHIL. 587 (2009)).
146. Knobe, supra note 5, at 323.
147. Id. (emphasis omitted). Indeed, if motivational bias were causing the
Knobe Effect in this scenario, then people would have to be “displeased with the
agent who performs the bad action, [have] their intuitions thereby become
distorted by moral judgment, and . . . end up being motivated to conclude: ‘This
bad guy must have been the sole cause of the wonderful outcome that resulted.’”
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If the Knobe Effect is caused by judgments about conduct rather
than outcomes, then it is not infected by motivational bias.
Additionally, judging a person based on her conduct is consistent
with Binder and Crump, who suggest that conduct, apart from
mental states, is relevant to culpability.148 In fact, the theories of
Binder and Crump seem well suited to avoiding motivational bias in
felony murder because their proposed limitations would force factfinders to focus on the defendant’s conduct and not the emotionally
laden outcome.149
3. Outcome Bias
Outcome bias, like the other two biases, may suggest that the
Knobe Effect reflects a mistaken perception. Outcome bias is the
phenomenon that judgments about a person’s conduct are influenced
by the outcomes it causes.150 As explained in the previous section,
motivational bias (dealing with blame for outcomes) is not a serious
problem for Knobe’s theory because research shows that people
label actions intentional based not on outcomes but on the
underlying conduct.151 Outcome bias, however, suggests that
morally bad outcomes cause people to judge the conduct too
harshly, thus making them attribute more intent to the action than

Id. If such an explanation is unlikely, then perhaps the Knobe Effect operates
independently of judgments regarding blame. Moreover, some research suggests
that people judge whether an action is intentional before they judge whether the
actor is to blame for the outcome. Id. at 322. On the other hand, participants in that
study may have assigned blame for the bad conduct regardless of the outcome.
148. See supra Part II.B. Binder, of course, argues that outcomes are relevant
to culpability, Binder, supra note 59, at 1030–31, 1034, which is not necessarily
inconsistent with avoiding motivational bias insofar as conduct and outcomes can
be prejudged in the abstract. See infra Part III.C.
149. A problem with this argument is that felony murder cannot be divorced
entirely from outcomes because it depends, by definition, on the fact that a death
occurred. Moreover, as Binder argues, perhaps society should punish completed
attempts more severely than failed attempts. Binder, supra note 59, at 1028.
Nevertheless, considering that felony murder does not require proof of a subjective
intent to kill or recklessly endanger, it is arguably less infected by motivational
bias than the traditional murder rule. In other words, and as discussed in more
detail in the next section, felony murder depends on the culpability of objectively
observable action, not the subjective thoughts of the defendant, thus diminishing
the effect of motivational bias.
150. Lijtmaer, supra note 132, at 641 (citing Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight
Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277,
1282 (1999)) (explaining that outcome bias is “the tendency to judge the quality of
a decision, good or bad, based on its consequences”).
151. Knobe, supra note 5, at 322–23. See also supra Part III.C.2.
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they should. In this way, the morally bad outcome of death could
cause observers to wrongly conclude that the underlying conduct
embodied sub-baseline intentions.152
Outcome bias thus presents a serious problem for my argument
that felony murder can be restricted to intentional killings. All may
agree that a killing is not intentional under Knobe’s theory unless
the conduct exhibited sub-baseline intentions regarding the death. I
have argued that this is the proper limit for felony murder—in
accordance with Solan, Binder, and Crump—because it ensures that
the rule applies only to intentional killings.153 However, people may
be unable to judge whether a defendant’s conduct exhibited subbaseline intentions because the morally bad outcome biases their
judgments about the conduct itself.
In a sense, however, one can prejudge a person’s subjective
intent regarding certain outcomes. For example, before the CEO
implements her business plan, one can decide in the abstract
whether her ambivalence toward the environment is above or below
the baseline of expected intentions. In the same way, one can decide
in the abstract which felonies, or which kinds of conduct during
felonies, demonstrate sub-baseline intentions regarding the risk of
death.
Perhaps, then, felony murder laws can avoid outcome bias by
prejudging, in the abstract, which conduct demonstrates the kinds of
sub-baseline intentions that make the homicide intentional. Even if
outcome bias would cause a judge or jury to perceive the
defendant’s conduct as morally worse than it was, the law can
remove such bias by limiting felony murder to conduct that satisfies
a set of predetermined conditions indicating the requisite sub152. Worse still, outcome bias is strongest when the outcome is the worst,
which suggests that people’s judgments about conduct could hardly be more
biased than in the case of an innocent person’s death. As Lijtmaer explains,
“research suggests that [outcome bias] is amplified as the severity of the injury
increases.” Lijtmaer, supra note 132, at 642 (citing Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect
of Outcome on Physician Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1957, 1960 (1991); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability:
Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1283 (1999) (“Outcome
bias appears to be most serious when the victim’s injuries are severe. Although the
research findings have been inconsistent, most conclude that severity is associated
with a greater assessment of fault.”)). Lijtmaer cites a study involving an actor
who caused an injury. When the scenario was changed from a permanent injury to
a temporary injury, participants judged the actor to have taken appropriate care
28% more often. Yet when the scenario was changed from a temporary injury to a
permanent injury, participants judged the actor to have taken appropriate care 31%
less often. Id. at 642 (citing Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of Outcome on
Physician Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1957,
1960 (1991)).
153. See supra Part II.C.
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baseline intentions. Again, 35 states use lists of “inherently
dangerous” felonies for this purpose, and Crump’s formulation—
which looks for conduct during a felony that is “clearly dangerous to
human life”—could serve the same purpose.154 Outcome bias could
thus be avoided by deciding in advance which types of conduct
during a felony indicate the sub-baseline intentions that make the
killing intentional.155
Three problems remain. First, as Tomkovicz and Gerber point
out, politics will influence which felonies and types of conduct are
included on the list, likely making the list too long.156 Second,
outcome bias will still influence which felonies and types of conduct
are included. The study cited by Lijtmaer, after all, involved
hypothetical scenarios, and the participants still exhibited significant
outcome bias.157
Third, sentencing decisions are unavoidably infected with
outcome bias. This is perhaps the most difficult problem to resolve.
To be sure, outcome bias infects sentencing in all cases, not just
felony murder, but the fact that felony murder authorizes murderlevel punishment even when the defendant did not subjectively
intend to kill or recklessly endanger exacerbates the problem of
inflated sentencing. In other words, felony murder allows judges,
who are unavoidably affected by bias, to be too harsh.158 Moreover,
although lawmakers can prejudge felonies and conduct, they cannot
prejudge sentencing decisions because determinate sentences are

154. For example, lawmakers could prescribe certain kinds of conduct, similar
to aggravating factors, required for a felony murder conviction.
155. Whatever role outcome bias plays in the Knobe Effect would be negated
as well because, even if people wanted to attribute intent based on a biased
perception of Solan’s baseline, they would not be able to impose punishment for
intentional murder unless the action satisfied the predetermined conditions.
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. Lijtmaer, supra note 132, at 642. Perhaps this problem could be mitigated
by structuring the deliberation process to avoid referring to the outcome of the
conduct. Of course, the purpose of the discussion—to create rules for felony
murder—would remain a biasing factor, but hopefully the specter of death would
be sufficiently obscured to reduce the effect of outcome bias. Again, this
discussion underscores how important it is for judges and juries not to have
discretion to decide whether a certain instance of conduct constituted disdain for
human life. When a real person’s death is before the decision-maker, outcome bias
will be the strongest, which means that judges and juries will be most prone to
overestimate the defendant’s culpability.
158. See, e.g., Douglas W. Schwartz, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence for
Felony Murder on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1985); Greg Bailey,
Student Work, Death by Automobile As First Degree Murder Utilizing the Felony
Murder Rule, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 235 (1998).
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unconstitutional.159 Outcome bias in sentencing, therefore, merits
further consideration, especially with regard to felony murder.
V. CONCLUSION
I argue that Knobe’s theory provides a framework in which
lawmakers can restrict felony murder to intentional killings, thus
confining the rule to the most deserving defendants and answering
the retributivist charge that felony murder does not account for
culpability. Yet the question remains: Should theories like Knobe’s
have any bearing on how criminal laws are designed, or should the
law be structured on a purely rational basis, not bending to folk
research about the popular understanding of words?
At one level, the question is beyond the scope of this Article,
which simply presumes that retributive theory should at least
consider what people actually mean when they talk about core
concepts such as intent and culpability. Moreover, I avoid any
discussion of utilitarian criminal theory, taking no position on the
separate question of whether retributivism itself may be outdated,
brutish, or ineffective at accomplishing the goals of criminal law. I
strongly believe, however, that lawmakers and theorists should not
ignore the current explosion of psychological and cognitive research
that bears on concepts relevant to criminal law. Much of this
research, like Knobe’s, draws into question even the most
established and widely accepted premises. Such is the case,
moreover, under all theories of punishment: retributive, utilitarian,
or otherwise. This Article is thus part of the growing movement that
employs experimental research to examine and reevaluate the
presumptions and justifications underlying legal doctrines. In the
context of criminal laws, which routinely and as a matter of course
deprive people of their most basic liberties, such continual
reexamination could hardly be more important.

159. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249–258 (2005) (striking down
the portion of the Federal Sentencing Act that created a determinate sentencing
scheme).

